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The First Republican Election
Victory in Iowa
By MORTON M. ROSENBERG
Associate Professor of Social Science
Ball State Teachers Gollege
Noteworthy about the Iowa political scene dui'ing the mid-
dle years of the 185O's was the existence of several groups
of political dissidents who were unaffiliated with ajiy of the
organized xDolitical paities in tlie state. Free Soilers, anti-
Nebraskaites, temperance advocates, abolitionists, disenchant-
ed Democrats, disgruntled Whigs—all provided fertile ground
for political ferment.
Regular Democrats and Old-line Whigs, as well as the anti-
foreign, anti-Gatholic Know-Nothing Part)- sought to enlist
these splinter elements behind their respective platforms.
Since tíie Whig organization, though ostensibly triumphant
over the Democrats in the ^'itally important gubernatorial
election of 1854, had largely disintegrated, the Iowa Democ-
racy, as the Democrats often called themselves, could look
to future political campaigns with renewed optimism. The
union of tlie diverse splinter groups into an effective political
organization could, howevei, destroy the power of the Demo-
crats in Iowa.
The election of 1854 had provided the leader who possessed
the necessaiy ability to fuse the vai'ious opposition groups,
togetlier with the main body of the Old-line Whigs, into a
compact and efficient political machine. Such a person was
Governor James W. Grimes who had won a bitter, uphill
battle for the gubernatorial office against a soHdly entrenched
but shaiply divided Democratic opposition.
Grass-roots support for a new political p;uty manffested
itself as eai-ly as the summer of 1854 when a Republican or-
ganization was formed in Fayette county with a strong anti-
slavery base as its raison d'etre. Later, on November 29, the
Burlington Daily Telegraph, a self-proclaimed political neu-
tral, suggested that a Republican part\' should be established
on a state-wide basis. In April of the following year, James
Grimes indicated to Salmon P. Ghase of Ohio that "it is time
355
356 ANNALS OF IOWA
to thoroughly organize the Republican party," which, he
believed, would draw support from the state's sizeable for-
eign-bom population as well as from the outspoken nativists.
JAMES W . GRIMES
Word of an impending Republican state convention began
to circulate in December, 1855, even before tlie publication
of the official announcement. In order to persuade the Know-
Nothings to join in a common cause with them, some Repub-
Hcans-to-be suggested that their convention should coincide
with the Know-Nothing meeting. All that would be necessaiy
to unite the two groups would be an agreement on the basic
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issues, ignoring minor questions and diflerences. Indeed, this
is what occurred, even though the two groups met separately.
The Dubuque Times boasted that thousands of Know-Noth-
ings had joined the Republican party, while at the same time
"desiring . . . that the piu i^ty of the elective franchise should
be preserved, and that Jesuitism and poltical Romanism
should not combine to endanger the peace and safety of our
institutions." Crimes, himself, was convinced that the Know-
Nothings, whose principles he personally abhorred, were serv-
ing tlie useful function of destroying the old party alignments.
On Januaiy 3, 1856, the official call went out for a conven-
tion to gather in Iowa City on February 22 for the purpose
of organizing a Republican party. Believing that many persons
had joined tlie Know-Nothing party mei-ely on a temporary
basis for want of any other desirable organization. Republi-
can leaders were confident that a sizeable number from the
nativist group would join the new party. Although it was not
specifically known at the time, it appeared quite probable
that Covernor Crimes had penned the call and would be the
leading figure at the Iowa City convention.
When the convention assembled on the appointed date, it
not only proceeded \vith the contemplated organization, but
it also nominated a full slate of candidates for the vaiious
state offices to be filled later in the year, and selected dele-
gates to attend the ptut^ '^s national convention. In addition, it
drew up a platform and published an address to the people of
[owa which, more or less, restated the ptu-ty's principles as
expressed in its platform.
Since representatives from virtually all of tlie splinter
groups attended the meeting, it was essential that nothing be
adopted which might give offense, lest the entire effort to
effect a unified party should end in failure. Thus, the platform
was essentially a statement of the pai-ty's anti-slavery senti-
ments. Tlie Republican Paity, according to one plank, had a
"mission . . . to maintain the Liberties of the People, the
Sovereignty of tlie States, and the Peipetuity of the Union."
Slavery was a local institution "beyond om- reach and above
our authority," but with regard to the territories "we will op-
pose its spread." Otlier planks condemned tlie South and de-
novinced the national Democratic administi-ation and declared
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that the federal govemment was one of limited powers. The
last clause probably was inserted to satisfy both the Old-line
Whigs and the former Democrats who were present.
On the more conti-oversial local issues which could have
divided the convention, such as temperance and nativism, the
Repubhcan platform remained discreetly silent. Since Prohibi-
tion had already been approved by Iowa voters during the
previous yeai-, a sti-ong stand on this question would have
provoked needless sti-ife with those who had opposed the
measure. Silence might disappoint temperance men, but
would not offend them. Anti-temperance forces undoubtedly
harbored some resentment owing to this omission.
But failure to condemn the Know-Nothings, a deliberate
attempt to avoid alienating former members of the nativist
party, aroused a good deal of anger and chagrin among the
foreign groups in the state, particulai'ly among the Germans
who were especially sensitive to any anti-foreign sentiment.
Moreover, since they had already been angrily stirred by the
successful enactment of Prohibition, the presence of temper-
ance men at the Republican convention could not have been
very pleasing to them. Covemor Crimes, himself, commented
that the Cermans resented the faikue of the convention to
state categorically that it abided by the existing federal
natm-aUzation laws. The reason for this, Ciimes explained,
stemmed from opposition from Know-Nothings as well as
from others who prefeiTed njerely an anti-slavei-v piatfonn
and nothing more.
The editors of three of the leading German language news-
papers in Iowa, the Biu'lington Die Freie Presse, the Daven-
port Der Demokrat, and the Dubuque Die Staats Zeitung,
declared that they were not satisfied with the position taken
by the Republican party on the question of nativism and
naturalization laws. A meeting of Germans in Dubuque adopt-
ed a number of resolutions echoing this disappointment. It
remained to be seen how the Germans would vote in the
elections of 1856.
In the meantime, county Repubhcan organizations con-
tinued to spring up, both before and after the state conven-
tion of the new party. In most cases these merely replaced
the old Whig groups, laut on a more broadened base to include
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the splinter elements. The county- platforms generally re-
peated the pronouncements of the state organization on the
main issue of slaveiy.
The Democratic press, of cour.se, greeted the formation of
the new party with scorn and derision. The Iowa State Gazette
declared that the aims of the new party were "to disti-act the
countiy and imperil the Union," for it could prevent the ad-
mission of any new state into the Union which might adopt a
slavery constitution. The Reporter of Iowa Git\' charged that
"Republicanism is . . . [synonymous with] . . . Abolitionism."
The new organization had merely changed names, but had not
abandoned its old characteristics. The Pella Gazette suggest-
ed that the new part)- should be called "Black" because sym-
pathy with the black race was it major tenet. Most anti-Repub-
lican newspapers did, in fact, call their rivals "Black Re-
publicans" as a matter of course. Nor did Republicans shirk
from employing a few choice epithets of their own when re-
ferring to the Democracy.
In the elections of 1856, the Democrats of Iowa would face
a series of contests against a part\- which was substantially
united and embraced the various splinter groups of the state.
The Democracy, however, continued to reel from the schism
over the Nebraska issue, railroads, temperance, nativism, and
other local and national questions. The outcome of the 1853
campaign would attest just how well Grimes and his allies
had done their work of political reconstniction.
In order to repossess their quaneling elements and mold
them into a smoothly functioning, harmonious unit the leaders
of the Iowa Democracy needed to exhibit a spirit of concilia-
tion. Rankled feelings and ruffied nerves called for balm
rather than whip. Yet, the men who ran the pai'ty, principally
Senator George W. Jones and his supporters, refused to com-
promise with their disaflected brethren, and insisted, instead,
that only loyal supporters of the national Administration be
permitted to attend the party's state con\'ention on January 8,
1856 to select delegates to the national convention and to
nominate candidates for the local ticket. Loyalty to the na-
tional Administration and its policies would be the essential
test of party orthodo.xy.
The Democratic state platform clearly reflected the pre-
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dominance of Administration supporters in the convention.
After paying the usual lip service to the Gonstitution and
to equal justice for all states regai-dless of section, the platform
strongly lauded the Kansas-Nebraska Act and excoriated all
those. Democrats included, who had raised then- voices in op-
position. President Pierce and his official family received a
ringing endorsement, while the state administration of James
Grimes and his cu'cle merited sti-ong rebuke. Another plank
condemned the Know-Nothings by name and read out of the
pai-ty any Democrat who belonged to the secret nativist order.
On the other issues vital to the interests of Iowans, such as
homesteads, banking, internal improvements, and railroad
grants, the part}' solons remained silent.
The best tiling that can be said for the Democratic platform
is that it was inept. At least one interested observer forecast
a probable defeat for the Iowa Democracy because of its un-
compromising stand on the Nebraska question as a test of
party fidelity.
The state convention weighted its delegates to the national
Democratic convention at Gincinnati with administration men
and likewise chose 'trusted' men to be candidates for the local
offices. If the renegade Democrats had expected to be concili-
ated at Iowa Gity, they must have been sorely disappointed.
At Gincinnati tlie Democrats adopted a platform designed to
preserve tlie imity of the national organization. In various in-
troductory planks, the Demo(;rats reaffirmed their opposition
to a national bank and internal improvements, reiterated their
belief in the principle of states' rights, and called for a strict
intei-pretation of the Gonstitution. Ihe crucial portions of the
platform, however, concerned slaveiy. Not only did the
Democrats pledge to resist the renewal of the slavery con-
troversy, but they went on record as endorsing tlie principle
of "non-interference by Gongress wth Slaveiy in State and
Territoiy, or in the District of Golumbia." Glosing portions of
the platfonn condemned the Republcan and Know-Notliing
parties and heartily lauded the Pierce Administration.
Although some individuals like Gharles Mason viewed the
action of the Democrats vdth a critical eye and were especi-
ally hostile to the platform. Administration partisans, blinding
FIRST REPUBLIGAN ELEGTION VIGTORY IN IOWA 361
themselves to the discontent which ripped the party, expressed
optiinistic hope of victory in the coming political sti-uggle.
Thus, P. M. Gasady could assure Senator Jones, leader of the
Administi-ation group, that the party in the Polk County area
"will certainly sueceed." Another Democrat confidently be-
lieved his paiiy would cany the state.
Most portents, however, forecast a stimning disaster for the
Democracy unless the leadership awakened to remedy its ail-
ments. From the valions corners of the state, messages warn-
ed and editorials declared that the Germans were beginning
to desert the Democrats and were joining the Republicans.
The latter, it should be remembered, had adopted a stiict anti-,
slaveiy plank in response to the Democratic Nebraska en-
dorsement. Wliile the Germans received tire platform of tlie
new party lukewarmly and with reservations, they could, and
did, accept its pronouncements on slavery. In Keokuk, how-
ever, German dissatisfaction stemmed not so much from slav-
ery as from a more personal issue intimately connected with
the pocketbook—wages for labor. Apparently they believed
they were victims of wage discrimination.
Dissension within the ranks, unified opposition under a new
party label, and the possibility of ha\ing alienated some of
its foreign-bom adherents were not the only difficulties con-
fronting the Iowa Democracy in 1856. The American Paity,
commonly labeled Know-Nothings, had blossomed into a po-
tentially sti-ong group with county and state organizations and
with a press of its o\vn. The national convention of the Ameri-
can Party met in Philadelphia on Febmary 22 and chose
Millard Fillmore for President and Andrev/ J. Donelson for
Vice-President. Ihe Know-Nothing platform reasserted its
basic nativist tenets and condemned the national Democratic
Administration for passing the Kansas-Nebraska measure,
thereby reopening the slavery controversy.
Know-Nothing supporters in Iowa greeted the action of
their national convention somewhat unentliusiastically. The
backers of Fillmore and Donelson sought to drum up interest
in the state convention of the nativist order, scheduled to meet
in Iowa Gity on Mtu-ch 5. When the date for the meeting ar-
rived, attendance was disappointing. The 45 delegates who
did attend, endorsed tlie national nominations. They chose a
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slate of presidential electors and adopted a Prohibition reso-
lution in addition to the usual nativist planks.
Another sparsely attended Know-Nothing meeting conven-
ed at Chariton, Lucas county, in May. Delegates endorsed
the Fillmore-Donelson ticket and the Philadelphia resolutions,
and nomüiated John J. Selman for Congress from the First Dis-
trict. A meeting of members of the nativist order at Oskaloosa,
also in May, refused to go along with the Philadelphia plat-
form or the party's ticket, and condemned both. Thus, the
Know-Nothings were themselves \\'eakened by factionalism,
caused pai-tly, no doubt, by the forination of the Repubhcan
party which former Know-Nothing adherents could join with-
out necessaiily compromising their nati^^st attachments or
antislaveiy principles.
Notwithstanding the evidence of Know-Notbing weakness
in Iowa, a few party newspapers strove valiantly to popu-
larize theü- candidates. Fillmore received praise as the one
man not pledged to either of the warring sections of the
countiy. His two opponents, John C. Fremont, Republican,
and James Buchanan, Democrat, were sectional candidates;
the former was too friendly to the North, while the lattei- was
a captive of the South. In addition, Fremont was a Catholic!
Thusly, did Know-Nothing editorials rant down to the day of
the election.
The Republicans were determined to take both Congres-
sional races from the Democrats in addition to the other of-
fices at stake in the coming elections. In the Second District,
embracing the Northern portion of Iowa, they chose Timctliy
Davis to nm against the Democratic nominee. Shepherd Lef-
fler. The latter, a Pennsylvanian, an alumnus of Washington
College, and a resident of Burlington since 1835, had served
in Congress from 1846 to 1850. In the Congressional election
of 1848, the defeated rival was this same Timothy Davis. like
Leffier, Davis, a New Jersey native, could boast of long resi-
dence in the state, having gone to Dubuque in 1837 by way of
Kentucky and Missouri. Democrats had not controlled the Sec-
ond Disùict since 1852, and now the Republicans could clium
it as their own private bailiwick.
In the First District, or Southern part of Iowa, the Demo-
crats renominated the incumbent Augustus tiall, a staundi
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JOHN C. FREMONT
Administi-ation and Nebraska supporter. This strategy seemed
wise for Hall had demonsti-ated his vote-getting ability two
years earUer, when he won with a pro-Nebraska platform.
The Republicans, however, trotted out a sure-fire issue to
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enable tliem to defeat their opponents. In addition to the usual
condemnations of slaveiy, the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act and the repeal of the Missouri Gompromise, they adopted
a plank concerning railroads in which they condemned Hall
for "negligence and inefficiency" owing to his failure to secure
federal grants of land to aid in tlie construction of other rail-
roads in the Distinct apart from the grant which Gongress had
approved for Iowa in 1856. Moreover, to mn against Hall, the
Republicans selected Samuel R. Gurtis, a West Pointer and for-
mer railroad surveyor and engineer. The railroad issue had
earlier unseated one Democratic Gongressman; perhaps it
could defeat another.
In many ways the Republican party of Iowa was born under
a lucky star. The Iowa Land Grant, for example, had come
at an opportune moment politically. In mid-May of 1856 Gon-
gress passed an act which gave Iowa approximately four and
a half million acres of land from the vast public domain for
the purpose of assisting in the constnitcion of raihoad lines
across the state. The demand for railroads was strong among
Iowans. Western Iowa, during the middle years of the 185O's,
maintained communication with the Eastern portion of the
state by means of the stage coach, whicrh scarcely could equal
the railroad coach in comfort and speed. Produce usually made
its way down navigable streams in order to reach the larger
towns and cities for shipment to the South or East. Rapids
just above Keokuk, however, impeded traffic on the Missis-
sippi River. Railroads could by-pass such river obstructions.
The chief means to insure the construction of railroads in a
state where capital was limited and traffic scanty was to secure
a Gongressional gift of land. Indeed, Iowa's delegation to Gon-
gress, both Democratic and Whig, had labored diligently for
years to obtain such a grant of land. For political reasons,
however, the Republicans of Iowa sought successfully to ob-
scure the role of the Democrats in securing the Iowa Land
Grant.
Fortuitous also for the Republicans was the creation of a
new poHtical issue which dropped into their laps to aid them
during the 1856 campaign. Within the space of a single week,
national passions became heated again as Preston Brooks play-
ed the role of avenger against Gharles Sumner, and John
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Brown acted as the self-appointed agent of the Lord at Ossa-
wattamie following the Southern attack upon the Free Soil
town of Lawi-ence, Kansas. Kansas and the troubles there be-
came the chief issue of the election campaign in tlie Hawkeye
state. Indeed, Kansas became a veritable crusade, charged
with enough moral tones to arouse the entire nation, let alone
a mere section or a single state.
In Gongress, Iowa's delegation carried on a running battle
against one another over the Kansas question. While Demo-
crat Augustus Hall, in the House, defended popular sover-
eignity and denied that ths national government could inter-
fere in any way with the proceedings in Kansas, Whig-turned-
Republican James Harlan, in the Senate, insisted that the fed-
eral government possessed the power to regulate slavery in the
the territories and, hence, in Kansas. He demanded the ad-
mission of Kansas into the Union under its free Topeka Gon-
stitution. Democratic Senator, George W. Jones, replied to his
Republican colleague three weeks later, holding steadfastly to
the Administration line on the Kansas problem, denying the
right of the federal government to interfere in Kansas and
backing popular sovereignity. "The people of Kansas," Senator
Jones declared, had the right to decide "for themselves this
question of admitting slavery within their borders, and to be
admitted into the Union with or without it, as they may
elect."
In Iowa, the Democrats charged their foes with deUber-
ately stiiring up emotions over the Kansas situation in order
to enhance the chances of success for their ticket. Iowa, wrote
United States Marshal Laurel Summers, "is literally ovemm
with 'interlopers' hai-anguing the people in favor of 'free Kan-
sas' as they say. Fanaticsm is the order of the day and among
a certain class of people all love for tlie Union and Gonstitution
seems to have fied." Even a number of Republicans conceded
that much of the excitement over Kansas was "made for elec-
tioneering purposes."
Perhaps one of the reasons why the Republicans, and in-
deed many other Iowans, felt so keenly about Kansas was that
they were not discussing an absti-act issue, but had long
been engaged in playing positive roles in the bitter conflict
which raged in that territoiy between free-state and slave-
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state men. Many Iowans were active in the operation of the
Underground Railway which spirited nmaway slaves thi-ough
the Noith and into Ganada, One of the routes extended across
the state from Tabor in the southwest corner, tlirough Des
Moines and Iowa Gity, on up to Clinton, and across the Mis-
sississippi River into Illinois. Fugitive slaves were also taken
thi-ough Appanoose county, one of the IDemocratic pai-ty's
strongholds along the southern tier of counties. Many of the
operators of the imderground transit system transported a
different cargo back ;xlong these same routes, tliis time carry-
ing guns and munitions to be used against the pro-slavery
forées in Kansas. The little town of Tabor became the head-
quarters of the nortliern Kansas forces. Free-state men made
little or no effort to eonceal their tiùps thi-ough Iowa, backed
as they were by a Kansas Committee operating in the Hawk-
eye state. Iowa City became the eastern focal point in the
state for the free-state adherents.
Responsible leaders of the Republican party were among
those who actively and energetieally supported and encour-
aged the movements of men and munitions to and from
troubled Kansas. WiUiam Penn Clarke, a foi-mer fiery Free
Soil Party leader, was chairman of the Kansas Committee in
Iowa. He assisted John Brown on more than one occasion. A
member of the Republican State Centi-ai Committee, Henry
O'Connor, spent consideraljle time in Kansas in behalf of the
free-staters. Governor James W. Grimes, as chief executive
of Iowa, wi-ote to President Pierce demanding federal pro-
tection for Iowans who migrated to Kansas. Unless the fed-
eral government acted promptly to protect the lives and prop-
erty of Iowans in Kansas, Grimes threatened to take state ac-
tion to achieve this end. Later in the year, he asked the Iowa
General Assembly to support his bold statements. Grimes,
moreover, developed an astonishing lapse of memoiy in order
to aid the anti-slavery cause in Kansas. He carelessly left the
key to the Iowa aisenal on his desk one day, where it was
found by the 'proper' Kansas man who then appropriated
some 1500 muskets from the stock available for use in Kansas.
Josiah B. Grinnell was another prominent Republican who
more than once entertained John Brown in his home and sup-
plied him with wliatever materials lie could collect.
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Still, despite the Kansas crisis, some Republicans were pessi-
mistic about their party's ability to carry Iowa. William Penn
Clai-ke wi-ote to Senator James Harlan asking him to obtain
outside speakers to stump the state. Harlan replied that na-
tional Republican leaders considered Iowa safe for the partA'
and that local speechmaking efforts would have to tmn the
trick. The Senator admitted, nevertheless, that he was not
as confident about Iowa as the national party spokesmen. Re-
publican campaign speakers, such as Charles C. Nourse, who
attempted to stump for the pai-ty in areas of Democratic pre-
ponderance, faced hostile crowds arwed with rotten eggs.
Here, he and his supporters were called "damn black republi-
cans."
Democratic campaign tactics, meantime, were weak and
ineffectual. The Republicans, the ]3emocracy charged, were
purely a sectional group, while the Democratic party was a
national organization, and had the best interests of the Union
at heai-t. At tlie same time the Democrats assailed the anti-
foreign, anti-Cathohc bias of the Know-Nothings, and prom-
ised to sü-ive "for the free, imresti-ained, unlimited, and un-
qualified right of Cathohcs as well as others to worship Cod
according to the suggestions and dictates of their consciences
and without subjecting them to any political disabilities what-
ever therefor." Moreover, continued a staunch Democratic
journal, the ptuty "will insist also upon the unrestiained right
of slave-holders, as of others, to migrate with their goods and
chattels to the Ten-itories of the United States. So far as the
Democi-acy was concerned, it did not intend to bother itself
with any moral pronouncements on the subject of slavery pro
or con. Hence, the Democracy was able to do little or nothing
to counter the emotional appeal and moral atüactiveness of
the Repubhcan position witli regai'd to the Kansas issue. To
be sure, Kansas was bleeding a bit. The Republicans, how-
ever, ü-ansformed the rivulets of blood into a veritable flood
of gore for public consmnption throughout Iowa.
On August 4, 1856, the voters of Iowa went to the polls
to cast their ballots to fill the Congressional seats as well as
the lesser state offices. The results of the election stunned the
Iowa Democracy. In their veiy first campaign in the Hawkeye
state as an organized political party, the Republicans swept
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the election with ridieulous ease. They captiu-ed all the state
oflBces by mai-gins of 7,500 votes or better and secured control
of the General Assembly by a tw^n-to-one majority in each
branch of the Legislative.
In the Gongressional races. Democrats rehnquished their
conti-ol of the First Distiict for the first time in tlie state's
brief histoiy, while the paiiy defeat in tlie Second IDistiict
was even more decisive. Here, Timothy Davis whipped Shep-
herd Leffler by a vote of 21,885 to 15,870. The former received
57.89 per cent of the total vote, the largest percentage won by
any victorious candidate during the 185O's. LefHer carried only
six of the 43 counties in his District including the
Democracy's Dubuque stronghold. Four of the Democratic
counties, Boone, Greene, Story, and Woodbury, are located in
the westeni portion of the l^istrict, attesting to the over-
whelming Republican superioiity in Eastern Iowa.
In the Frist District, the incumbent Augustus Hall succumb-
ed to his Republican rival, Samuel R. Ciutis, in a close contest
comphcated somewhat by the presence of a third party can-
didate, John Sehnan of the Know-Nothings. Hall received
17,110 votes in conti-ast to Curtis' 18,065 votes. In percentage
figures, Curtis attracted 50.17 per cent of the vote, while
Hall obtained 47.52 per cent, and Selman lured 2.29 per
cent with his 826 votes. Hall's figures represent a dechne of
2.75 percentage points o '^er the totals he had received in 1854.
John Selman obtained most of his support from tlie Southern
counties, Appanoose, Davis, Heniy, Lee, and Lucas, all of
which, with tlie exception of Henr)', went Democratic by
comfortable maigins.
Whether the German vote was a significant factor in tlie
Republican sweep of the Congressional races is open to ques-
tion. In the First District, 4,194 persons, not all of whom were
of German origin, were natiu-alized and entitled to cast bal-
lots. Of this number, 3,018 resided in counties carried by the
Democrats or in counties where Hall's percentage change from
his 1854 figures was negligible. Another 422 citizens of foreign
birth lived in Henry, Mahaska, Jasper, and Warren counties,
where Curtis compiled majorities totalling more than 2000
votes. An additional 442 natm'alized voters resided in ten
covmties which switched to the Republican column. In only
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two of these counties, Keokuk and Monroe, where Gurtis' mar-
gin of victory was slender, the German vote may have been a
significant factor in his triumph. His pluralities in the other
eight counties combined were more than tiiple the number of
naturalized persons living there. The remainder of the natur-
alized voters made their homes in counties which gave Gurtis
thumping majorities, far exceeding the number of foreign-
bom voters. Hence, one can only conclude that in the First
Congressional District as a whole, the German vote was not a
decisive factor in the defeat of the Democrats. Although the
German vote may have been significant in certain counties
such as Keokuk and Monroe, even this possibility' cannot be
demonstrated with absolute certainty.
The same conclusion must apply also to the Second District
which contained 10,295 naturalized voters. The German vote
may have been responsible, in part, for the defection of four
counties, Bremer, Des Moines, Jackson, and Johnson, to the
Republican column. Davis' margin of victory in these counties
with 1,708 naturalized voters totalled 397 votes. Elsewhere in
the District, the Democrats carried six counties with 2,268
foreign-bom voters, and scored gains in eight Republican
counties having 3,028 naturalized voters. Twelve coiintieü
cast hallots for the first time in a Gongressional election. These
went ovenvhelmingly to Davis, but only 353 citizens of foreign
birth resided in these newer counties. In twelve other counties,
where the Democracy sufiFered percentage losses, there lived
2,919 naturalized persons, but Davis' victory margin exceeded
this number by more than 500. Thus, except for the four
counties enumerated above, it is doubtful whether the German
vote in the Second District did little more than to add a few
hundi^ ed votes to Davis' already imposing margin of victory.
In November, the voters of Iowa again journeyed to the
polls, this time to register their preference for President.
Again the Democrats were soundly trounced. Of Iowa's
101,300 eligible voters, more than 92,400 exercised their
franchise privilege, giving Fremont 45,174 votes, Buchanan
•37,568 votes, and Fillmore 9,669 votes. Fremont won 48.88
per cent of the total \ ote, Buchanan attracted a mere 40.65
per cent, and Fillmore received a surprising 10.46 per cent.
Democratic strength, as usual, was concentrated along the
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Southern tier of counties, in Dubuque county, and in a cluster
of five counties in central Iowa. Pottawattainie and Woodbmy
counties, in the western part of the state, also returned heaAy
Democratic majorities.
The RepuHcans dominated Northern and Eastern Iowa for
the most pait, and scored victories in two groups of counties
in the southwestern sector of the state. The northern and
eastern portions of the state had long ceased to furnish the
Democracy with any reason for political joy.
Fillmore attiacted his largest following from the soutliern
counties, but his appeal elsewhere was also somewhat con-
siderable. Fillmore's popularity ran deeper than his associ-
ation with the American Party. His close connection to the
Gompromise of 1850 undoubtedly conti-ibuted not a little to
his appeal to Iowans.
Despite the universality of the Democratic defeat in the
state, party leaders nevertheless found something to celebrate
in the tiiumph of the Buchanan ticket in the nation. A gala
victory celebration took place in Dubuque to the accompani-
ment of speeches and bonfires, but the Democrats could not
eradicate the fact tliat the Republicans had cai-ried the state
overwhelmingly. Still, the Express and Herald of Dubuque
declare that ""the most dangerous political organization this
counti-y has ever seen" had been beaten nationally. The Re-
pubhcans, the Express insisted, sought only spoils and power,
not principles and Union.
Thus, the infant Republican Party of Iowa, expertly led by
James Grimes, James Harlan, William Penn Glarke, and a host
of other capable political figures, brilliantly pai'layed a series
of fortunate circumstances into a smashing victory in its first
encounter with the Democratic opposition The splintered,
dissident elements had indeed been effectively molded into
a powerful force which, acting together with the regular
Whigs, would enable the new party to continue to wield
the reins of pohtical power in the state during the waning
years of the final Ante Bellum decade.
Moreover, the new party, needing a broad base upon which
to appeal to Iowa voters in addition to the slavery qu^tion,
tied its future in large measure to the railroad, as the victory
FIRST REPULIGAN ELEGTION VIGTORY IN IOWA 371
of Samuel R. Gurtis partly attests. Republicans continued to
champion railroad consti'uction throughout the state, and re-
iterated Western, desires for a line to the Pacific. Some of the
leading figinres in the Republican organization w ere, or soon
would be, intimately associated with one railroad line or an-
other. In addition to Curtis, such Republican leaders as James
WnxiAM PENN CLARKE
Grimes, James Harlan, Grenvüle Dodge, William Penn Clai-ke,
H. M. Ho.xie, and John Kasson were closely connected with
raih-oading in one capacity or another. Many lesser figures
in the pai-ty also had railroad interests. While the Republican
Pai-ty grew out of the slavery controversy, it employed the
raih-oad question, together with several other key issues, to
maintain itself in power in Iowa. The results of the elections
of 1856 certainly testify to the eifieacy of such a policy.

